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European Parliament elections in May 2019 come at a critical time in the evolution of the EU 
as these will be the first elections after the expected departure of the UK (March 2019) and at a 
time when divergence on many issues characterises member state relations. Wider global 
developments weigh heavily on Europe with the return of hard geopolitics and efforts to 
undermine the global multilateral order. The European University Institute (EUI) wants to 
highlight the major issues that are at the heart of the political agenda at this juncture as a 
contribution to the debate. The papers are part of a wider programme on the elections 
including the development of a Voting Advice Application (VAA), euandi2019, and an online 
tool specifically tailored for mobile EU citizens voting either in their country of citizenship or 
residence, spaceu2019.
This initiative on the European Parliament elections in 2019 is part of the Schuman 
Centre’s European Governance and Politics Programme (EGPP) egpp.eui.eu. Launched in 
2018, the Programme aims to foster high-quality academic research and reflection on the 
European Union and European integration with a medium to long-term perspective. The 
EGPP also promotes engagement on contemporary issues through various events, including 
blog debates and thematic conferences and workshops.
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, created in 1992 and currently directed by Professor 
Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the 
process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st century global 
politics. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, projects 
and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is 
organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of 
European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s 
neighbourhood and the wider world. 
For more information: http://eui.eu/rscas 
The Policy Paper Series of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies complements its Working 
Papers Series. This series aims to disseminate the views of a person or a group on a particular policy 
matter, specifically in the field of European integration. 
The European University Institute and the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies are not 
responsible for the proposals and opinions expressed by the author(s). 
The aim of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies is to contribute to the public debate by 
offering views and opinions on matters of general interest. 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s). 
  
Abstract 
Africa is a young and fast-growing continent. It is urbanizing at a very high pace and progressing in 
income per capita, trade liberalization, human development and doing-business indicators. African 
countries are, however, very different from each other, with many still having a large informal sector, 
unstable institutions and unsolved ethnic struggles. This means that some countries can offer huge 
investment and trading opportunities, but others represent a risk, linked to migration, fragility and 
conflicts. This note highlights some recent positive ‘patterns and trends’ in the continent as a whole and 
the main challenges, suggesting that with changes in the environment and in the narrative around Africa, 
domestic and EU policies need to change. African governments need a long-term perspective: rather 
than just reacting to emergencies, they must tackle new challenges: market liberalization in a world of 
trade wars, unplanned fast urbanization and the quality of education, health and social policies in a 
resource-scarce environment. To exploit the positive spillovers of geographical proximity and not to 
leave the ground to China, the EU should envisage an innovative policy, also with a long-term view. 
Aid as in the past is not enough nor what is needed. For an ageing EU, Africa can become the main 
source of human capital, so the education of Africa’s young generations is important for the development 
of both Africa and Europe. Furthermore, the EU can share its expertise in urban planning, new 
technologies and education. Training may be worth more than money for the development of Africa.  
Keywords 
Africa, EU development policy, Global Value Chains. 
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1. A young, growing and urbanizing continent  
Africa is changing for the better: over the last 20 years its GDP has tripled and is now over $2 trillion. 
The average GDP growth between 1999 and 2018 was around 5 per cent a year, against a rate of less 
than 3 per cent in the period 1980-2000 (the so-called lost decades).1 The average rate, of course, masks 
much heterogeneity, but recently most African economies, not only the resource-intensive ones, have 
been resilient and are gaining momentum. Current projections (Brookings Institution, 2019) suggest that 
over the next five years twenty economies in sub-Saharan Africa2 will be amongst the world’s fastest 
growing economies.  
However, Africa’s recent high growth has not been accompanied by an increase in employment and 
this is an important challenge for domestic governments. Between 2000 and 2008, employment grew at 
an annual average rate of 2.8 percent, roughly half the rate of economic growth3 and between 2009 and 
2014 at 3.1 percent (1.4 percentage points below growth). One of the main reasons for this development 
could be the fact that Africa has deindustrialized: its share of global manufacturing is smaller than in 
1980 and the share of manufacturing in GDP is less than half the average for all developing countries. 
This suggests that many young Africans will not be formally employed in the industry sector, but rather 
in the informal sector. According to the ILO, if these trends continue, only about 100 million of the 450 
million Africans expected to reach working age over the next two decades can hope to find ‘decent 
work.’  
The slow growth in jobs has in turn slowed down poverty reduction. Although 50 million Africans 
have been lifted out of poverty in the last twenty years and the proportion of poor people in Africa 
declined from 56 percent in 1990 to 43 percent in 2012, the number of the poor increased from 278 
million in 1990 to 413 million in 2015. As of 2015, most of the global poor, in 27 of the world’s 28 
poorest countries which have a poverty rate over 30 percent, lived in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, 
although global poverty has fallen, prosperity has not been fully shared.  
While several human development indicators have improved in the past twenty years – the infant 
mortality rate has fallen by 22%, maternal mortality has dropped by 36%, literacy rates have risen to 70 
percent, with many countries over 90 percent, and average life expectancy at birth has increased from 
54 to 61 years – in half of the African countries investing in human capital is still key. Governments 
should promote access to tertiary education and improve education quality. In the past five years, 
education scores have registered a deterioration, suggesting that education outcomes are worsening. 
Enrolment levels are higher than before, but education quality and indicators measuring whether 
education is meeting the needs of the economy are worsening (Brookings Institution, 2019). 
Furthermore, while the average unweighted Gini coefficient declined (for sub-Saharan Africa), its 
standard deviation and coefficient of variation rose. This suggests that “the heterogeneity of inequality 
across countries, originally linked to land tenure and resource endowment, became more acute” and 
confirms that the “high level of inequality poses a serious challenge to realizing the overarching goal of 
‘leaving no one behind’ by 2030” (UNDP, 2017, p. 19). 
In a continent that in the next 20 to 30 years will add over a billion people to the total labour force4 
and is likely to have a working population larger than China’s, slow employment growth primarily 
                                                     
1 Even after the recent ‘crisis,’ GDP increased by 3.6 percent in 2017 and is estimated to accelerate to 4.1 percent in 2018 
and 2019. 
2 Ethiopia, Rwanda, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Benin, Kenya, Uganda, Burkina Faso and Tanzania will be the top ten 
in SSA. 
3 Excluding Algeria, Burundi, Botswana, Cameroon, and Morocco, which experienced employment growth of more than 4 
percent. 
4 According to official estimates, the total labour force should pass from 620 million in 2013 to nearly 2 billion in 2063. 
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affects women and young people (ages 15-24). This is an important challenge since Africa is a very 
young continent with over 225 million young people, a figure projected to increase to over 320 million 
by 2030. Half of Africans are under 19 and nearly 60% under 24.5 In some countries, like, for instance, 
Nigeria, there are more babies born every year than in the whole of Western Europe. But to reap the 
demographic dividend, Africa needs a healthy, educated and skilled labour force. The high level of 
informality in Africa also constitutes an obstacle. According to the ILO (2018), the informal economy 
accounts for 50-80 percent of GDP, 60-80 percent of employment and up to 90 percent of new jobs in 
Africa, where more than 60 percent of the population perform low-paid informal jobs. Definitions of the 
informal sector may vary,6 but the trend is worrisome and little is known of the phenomenon, except 
that its nature is local (informal firms need to operate close to their workers’ homes) and that the share 
of women outnumbers that of men (with unbalanced gender-related consequences).  
Africa is also becoming increasingly urbanized as its population increases and people move from 
rural to urban areas. In many countries, the urban population is growing by more than 3% a year. Every 
year, around 24 million Africans are moving to cities and ten of the world’s fastest growing cities 
between 2018 and 2035 are in Africa. Eight African cities are expected to more than double in population 
size in the next 15 years (UN-Habitat, 2018). This rising urban population with a relatively low per-
capita income and a lack (or at best inadequateness) of urban infrastructure – including transport, clean 
water, sewage etc. is a serious cause for concern. In rapidly urbanizing areas, slums are frequent7 and 
several areas, even those surrounding business districts, are without paved roads, which makes them 
more vulnerable to extreme climate events. Most African cities are then ‘physically fragmented,’ with 
important consequences for people and firms, which are likely to miss the economic opportunities of 
globalization. UN-Habitat (2018) claims that “such inefficiencies in the design of the city can make 
urban living costs burdensome and jeopardize the potential benefits of agglomeration.” Of course, the 
lack of infrastructure not only implies missing out on economic opportunities linked to market 
integration or foreign direct investment. The lack of clean water and sewage infrastructure, for instance, 
implies that diseases spread rapidly, amplifying the transmissibility of contagious ones and challenging 
the reaching of health-sustainable goals. Indeed, health is one of the still-unsolved big challenges (WHO, 
2016). 
Addressing these demographic changes and accompanying urban challenges is one of the main tasks 
for both domestic policy-makers and international organizations. GDP growth, the young population 
and the rapid pace of urbanization generate business opportunities in infrastructure, housing, health, 
financial services and other areas. Governments, and more recently also increasingly the private sector, 
plan to close these infrastructure gaps but many investors (especially foreign ones) share concerns about 
economic and political risks as obstacles to long-term investment and to the successful implementation 
of business strategies (European Report on Development, 2009). However, the rapid adoption of mobile 
and digital technologies (some of them developed in Africa, such as, for instance, Mpesa and mobile 
banking) could help Africa to leapfrog many obstacles such as the lack of physical infrastructure (phone 
lines, electricity etc. – see the European Report on Development, 2010) and many risks.  
                                                     
5 In 2015, 50% of the population in North Africa, 59% in Sub-Saharan Africa and 63-64% in other sub-regions were below 
24. 
6 For instance, for firms the criteria include registration status, size, tax status, compliance with social security legislation, 
the availability of accounting statements and whether the business has a permanent physical address.  
7 In some countries, over 50% of the population live in slums, with peaks in Chad and the Central African Republic (almost 
90%). 
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2. A low share of intra-Africa trade but a high potential for trade liberalization 
The share of intra-African exports as a percentage of total exports has traditionally been low, especially 
when compared to levels in other areas.8 However, in the last twenty years it has increased from about 
10 percent (1995) to around 17 percent (2017), suggesting changes in government attitudes to integration 
(and that some infrastructure problems and red tape have been lifted). Furthermore, the existing intra-
regional trade tends to be concentrated. According to the World Bank (2018), about two-thirds of the 
regional demand for exports is accounted for by 10 countries, including South Africa, Côte d’Ivoire and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Bilateral trade is also more intense between countries that are closer 
(in distance) and have common sociocultural characteristics (i.e. it is driven by a gravity trade model). 
With the explicit goal of increasing intra-Africa trade in a world which after many years of 
liberalization is now characterized by trade wars,9 increasing tariffs and other obstacles to trade, in 
March 2018 44 African countries signed the Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). Five more 
countries joined in June. In principle the agreement creates the largest free trade zone since the creation 
of the World Trade Organization in 1995:10 a single continental market for goods and services with 
countries committed to cutting tariffs on 90 percent of goods and a customs union with free movement 
of capital and people. However, the free trade area has to wait until at least 22 countries submit 
instruments of ratification and this is a slow process. By July 2018 only six countries had done so: Chad, 
Eswatini (Swaziland), Ghana, Kenya, Niger and Rwanda. The AfCFTA is also complemented by other 
important initiatives, including the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right to Residence and Right 
to Establishment, and the Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM). According to the Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA), with the agreement in place intra-African trade is likely to increase by 
52.3% by 2020. Compared to the situation with no AfCFTA in place, through the sole removal of tariffs 
on goods the agreement is estimated to increase the value of intra-African trade by 2040 by between 15 
percent (or $50 billion) and 25 percent (or $70 billion), depending on liberalization efforts. 
Not only trade, but also capital inflows are increasing and represent around 8 percent of GDP (2017). 
The composition of capital inflows has changed significantly in the last decade. According to the World 
Bank (2018) “the occurrence and interplay of three large external shocks (the 2007-08 global financial 
crisis, the 2011-12 European sovereign debt crisis and the 2014-15 plunge in commodity prices) have 
reshaped the composition and structure of financing in the region” (p.12). The main components of 
capital inflows are foreign direct investment11 and foreign aid but portfolio investments (through 
international bond issuances) have substantially increased since 2013. Nigeria and South Africa, the 
region’s two largest economies, account for 50 percent of FDI and the top 10 countries capture 80 
percent. The main contributor to capital flows is China; investment toward Africa sharply increased 
after the 2015 FOCAC summit, where China committed $60 billion to the continent. Flows have been 
geographically concentrated in oil-rich countries, like Nigeria and Angola, and in the transport and 
energy sectors and are the object of lively discussion amongst experts and policy-makers.  
                                                     
8 In Europe, the share is around 69 percent, in Asia 59 percent, and in North America 31 percent. 
9 The US, for example, has re-negotiated NAFTA, which is now called the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, pulled 
out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and imposed tariffs on billions of dollars of Chinese goods, including shoes and 
consumer electronics; China has responded in kind by proposing tariffs of its own. 
10 According to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), if all 55 African countries were to join the free trade area, 
it would be the world’s largest by number of countries, covering more than 1.2 billion people and a combined GDP of $2.5 
trillion.  
11 The average share of foreign direct investment (FDI) in total inflows increased from 24 percent in the 1990s to 75 percent 
during the 2000s. 
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3. Opportunities to enter international production networks despite (or thanks to) high 
heterogeneity 
African countries are very diverse in terms of their populations, development levels, GDP levels12 and 
growth rates, and also in terms of institutional stability (which is also linked to ethnic composition). 
Nigeria is the largest country with nearly 190 million people of different ethnicities, often in conflict. 
Ethiopia and Egypt have over 90 million people each. On the other hand, most other countries have 
populations below 20 million. Just nine countries (of the 54) make up three-quarters of Africa’s GDP 
and in 2030 three countries – Nigeria (20 percent), Egypt (17 percent) and South Africa (11 percent) – 
are likely to account for almost half of the whole African household consumption. Many smaller 
countries, however, are growing quickly and increasing their share of continental GDP and 
consumption. Their heterogeneity implies different possibilities of entering international production 
networks and exploiting the benefit of global value chains (GVCs). For many developing countries, 
participation in GVCs plays an important role in the process of structural transformation, contributing 
to the creation of more productive, higher-quality and higher-earning jobs. However, reaping the 
benefits of GVC integration does not come automatically, and the dynamics shaping the development 
of GVCs may also represent a threat to sustainable employment, particularly for those without portable 
skills or who face labour market segmentation. GVC integration is also likely to have distributional 
impacts, both through employment and wages (which are typically higher in firms involved in GVCs). 
Trade agreements such as AfCTA and policy plans such as the Chinese belt and road initiative affect 
the development of global value chains by linking markets, lowering transaction costs and contributing 
to regulatory conformity. African countries still have to fully exploit the possibilities provided by 
specializing in individual tasks rather than in whole production. 
GVC‐oriented trade offers significant opportunities, especially for small countries, to benefit from 
integration by changing the nature of their competitiveness. In the past, for a country to become an 
exporter it needed to have the capability of producing the whole product and the scale to assembly it 
(e.g. the car industry was a business for few!). Under the new GVC dynamics, a developing country can 
specialize in individual tasks and trade in intermediates. In this sense, GVCs “denationalize comparative 
advantage” (Taglioni and Winkler, 2014), as lead global firms construct global production networks by 
exploiting the most competitive locations for specific activities. African countries are still typically 
engaged in low value-added phases of production but the more they specialize the more they can enter 
higher value-added phases. Recent developments suggest that some countries – Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania – have started engaging in international production networks in 
manufacturing, agriculture and agro-business and, to a lesser extent, transport and tourism, and have 
benefited the most from deeper integration (Allard et al., 2016; Del Prete et al., 2016). To specialize in 
phases of production is simpler, attracts foreign direct investment and creates jobs. However, terrorism, 
conflicts, natural disasters and economic crises can discourage participation in international networks 
(e.g. over the last two decades Nigeria has experienced at least 2500 violent events, with important 
consequences). This is still an important challenge for Africa. 
4. African domestic policies 
African domestic governments are faced with many challenges, some of them already cited, such as 
very rapid urbanization, demographic dividends and a lack of decent jobs, especially for women and the 
young. As mentioned above, for years poor infrastructure has been one of the key impediments to 
investment and growth in Africa. For example, nearly 600 million Africans still lack access to electricity. 
However, significant progress has been made: Africa’s annual investment in infrastructure has doubled 
                                                     
12 11 countries – Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal and 
Tanzania – experienced growth rates above 5.4 percent in 2015-18 (World Bank, 2018). These countries house nearly a 
third of the region’s population and account for 20 percent of its total GDP.  
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to around $80 billion a year since the beginning of this century, suggesting a strong commitment by 
domestic governments (and international organizations).  
Another big challenge is represented by migration. Here, the perceptions from Africa and the EU are 
very different. Because of high costs, most African migrants move within the region and do not leave 
the continent. Between 2015 and 2017, for example, the number of African migrating within the 
continent jumped from 16 million to around 19 million, while those moving outside the continent passed 
from 16 million to 17 million. The main migration corridors are in west and southern Africa and are 
economically driven, connecting migrants to jobs in farming and informal trade. Nigeria and South 
Africa are the countries that most African migrants move to. Regional communities such as ECOWAS 
have recently made the free movement of people an important step in their strategies, launching regional 
passports and abolishing visa requirements. In March 2018, the African Union (AU) adopted a 
continent-wide protocol for free movement that could further enhance regional migration. 
A third challenge is the business environment, which has not been conducive to investments. 
However, according to the Doing Business Report (2018), in the last few years the majority of reforms 
have been made in Africa (a total of 905 reforms in 15 years). Many African countries started with weak 
regulatory institutions and costly inconvenient business regulation processes, but have been converging 
towards international standards, even though despite these improvements large gaps – mainly due to 
poor infrastructure, weak governance, a lack of access to financial resources and underdeveloped legal 
institutions – still exist between their performance and that of OECD countries. Across Africa, there is 
still much heterogeneity. Mauritius and Rwanda, for instance, rank highly (respectively 20th and 29th 
in the world) in overall ease of doing business, while Somalia and Eritrea among the worst.  
A fourth challenge is the adoption of new technologies. These could create jobs, for instance by 
stimulating new types of economic activity. However, the concern of policy-makers is that rising 
productivity could lead to fewer people being needed to perform the same tasks, challenging job 
creation. With Africa’s youth population growing rapidly, the impact of technological advances on 
employment is certainly an issue for concern and raises the question of how to prepare the young for 
new sectors and how to train workers in STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics), which currently lag behind in Africa. 
5. EU policies towards Africa 
Africa has a huge potential for trade, energy and investment, which are much needed in an ‘old’ 
continent such as the EU. While Europe is facing an ageing population, Africa is living through a youth 
bulge. Both continents could benefit from migratory movements, but if things go wrong they can both 
be subject to economic strain and political unrest.  
The EU can unlock Africa’s potential in a series of ways: “by developing the right mix of migration, 
mobility and integration policies; by supporting education and sustainable development; by bridging 
fair trade and economic integration objectives; and by favouring sustainable agriculture and green 
growth” (https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/redefining-our-relationship-africa).  
Back in 2005, the European Consensus on Development formulated the eradication of poverty in the 
context of sustainable development as the main objective of EU development cooperation,13 including 
the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These objectives have been reiterated and 
reinforced in various EC communications over the past few years. The post-2015 agenda could help the 
EU establish a fairer partnership with Africa. 
 
                                                     
13 European Consensus on Development, 2005. 
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The world has changed dramatically in the past few years, and with it the narrative around Africa. 
Cooperation cannot be rooted in foreign aid and a paternalistic view. It must be on an equal basis to 
address large economic and societal challenges (movements of migrants due to conflicts, uncertainty 
and climate change; competition for scarce resources etc.), to achieve the Sustainable Development 
Goals and to enhance inclusive growth both in developed and developing countries. For an ageing EU, 
Africa can become the main source of human capital, so the education of Africa’s young generations is 
important for the development of both Africa and for Europe. Furthermore, the EU can share its expertise 
in urban planning, new technologies and education. Training may be worth more than money for 
Africa’s development.  
International cooperation activities seem to have the scale and scope necessary to maximize impact 
but the level of coordination needs to be higher than it is now. While the EU has acknowledged that the 
policy cannot be ‘one size fits all,’ given the heterogeneity of the countries in the continent, Europe and 
Africa have an interest in working together on strategic development and interests. 
6. Conclusions 
Many African economies are more resilient and better placed to cope with crises than before. The 
continent is young, rapidly urbanizing, opening to trade, attracting foreign capital, integrating (to some 
extent) into international production networks and making progress in human development and in doing-
business indicators. These elements of appeal may, however, be offset by the persistence in many 
African countries of a large informal sector, unstable institutions and unsolved ethnic conflicts. 
Furthermore, even patterns, such as the ‘demographic dividend,’ which are seen as a great opportunity 
for Africa may turn into trouble because the skills of young Africans may not be appropriate. This 
implies that unemployment is highest among the most educated young people but a lack of opportunities 
to use their skills may trigger undesirable consequences (migration and/or violence). In other words, a 
growing population of better educated and urbanized young people encountering few jobs is a crisis in 
the making. What is probably one of the main challenges to be tackled by domestic governments is a 
long-term process requiring efficient investments in human capital.  
African governments must tackle new challenges with no set policy tool. They cannot just react to 
emergencies, such as extreme climate events, situations of fragility, economic crises, as in the past and 
leave active policies behind. Market liberalization in a world of trade wars, unplanned fast urbanization, 
the quality of education, health and social policies in a resource-scarce environment are issues that can 
only be addressed with a long-term perspective and envisaging new policy tools and new forms of 
cooperation with the other main actors on the international scene. 
Moreover, the EU should envisage an innovative policy toward Africa with a long-term view. The 
aim is to exploit the positive spillovers of geographical proximity and not to leave the continent under 
the influence of countries such as China, which has had a very effective foreign policy, integrating its 
aid and foreign direct investment and targeting countries in situations of fragility and conflict. For the 
EU, aid as in the past is not enough nor what is needed. For an ageing EU, Africa can become the main 
source of human capital, so the education of Africa’s young generations is important for the development 
of both Africa and Europe. This means, for instance, that migration has to be seen in a new way, through 
new lenses. Furthermore, the EU has a set of tools that can be shared on an equal basis: its expertise in 
urban planning, new technologies and education programmes. Training may be worth more than money 
for Africa’s development. Finally, for Africa it is true that the ‘one-size-fits-all approach’ cannot be 
followed.  
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